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Abstract. This study examines the mediating effect of leverage and 
dividend policy on the influence of corporate governance towards firm 
value. This is a quantitative study used secondary data of 181 companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in the year of 2014. The 
results showed that leverage did not mediate corporate governance-firm 
value relationship, and devidend policy partially mediated corporate 
governance-firm value relationship 
1. Introduction 
In 2002, the importance of corporate governance became more obvious as a series of 
corporate disasters such as frauds and meltdowns led to a series of bankruptcy filings after 
the 1998 economic crisis, included Enron and WorldCom)[1]. 
When a company is required to improve their performance quality through implementation 
of corporate governance, many steps have to be taken as form of responsibility to investors 
and creditors. Some of them are dividend distribution, controlling level of debt and 
repayment of principal loan amount and interest expense. The more payment for loan 
means lower return for shareholders. It is parallel with the findings of Hastori et al. [2], 
which said that there was a significantly negative relation between dividend payout policy 
and agency costs while leverage had significantly positive influence towards agency cost.   
Agency problem may occur when dividend paid is smaller because of higher payment for 
loan or higher amount of retained earnings. Many studies have been conducted to examine 
the relationship between corporate governance, leverage, dividend policy and firm value. 
Ionescu [3] argued that conducting corporate governance practices could transmit credible 
signal to investors. Appropriate corporate governance implementation could reduce the risk 
of managers’ misbehaviors. Therefore, it can be assumed that there was significant positive 
connection between quality of corporate governance and firm value. 
     When investors feel ensured that their investment is profitable and information given is 
transparent, firms can be indicated as having high level of credibility. The trust of investors, 
then, can increase the attractiveness of a firm in stock market which leads to increase in 
firm value. Furthermore, there were still inconsistency in the results of previous studies. 
Therefore the influences are still required to be reexamined. Also, there was no research 
that tried to combine corporate governance, leverage, dividend policy and firm value all 
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together. Therefore, the author is interested to study those relationships in Indonesian case. 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the existence of a significant direct   
and/or indirect influence of corporate governance, leverage and dividend policy towards 
firm value in companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).  
 
2. Literature review  
In the agency theory, agents who tend to fulfill their own interest, tend to act recklessly by 
investing in low or even negative present value project using excessive external funding. 
This harmful activity can cause asymmetry information between agents and principals in 
terms of segregation of functions between ownership and management. This agency 
problem indicates that firm value will increase if principals regulate agent’s behaviors in 
managing resources. Several previous studies found that the relationships between 
corporate governance and firm value varied. Board size and institutional shareholders were 
found that they influenced firm value positively while other indicators did negatively [4]. If 
the indicators are combined, corporate governance still has significant and positive 
connection with firm value [5]. Corporate governance can transmit strong signal to 
convince investors about companies’ credibility, meaning that corporate governance 
contributes to increasing firm value [3] [6]. 
Previous studies investigating the relationship between corporate governance and 
leverage found that corporate governance was related negatively with the level of leverage 
[7] [8] [9]. This happened because if the company improved its corporate governance 
practices, management would eventually consider debt as disciplining device. Corporate 
governance will direct management only to take appropriate possible actions [10]. In the 
other hand, it was also found that corporate governance could increase the level of leverage 
because it expanded its credit-access [11]. Companies which have more independent 
directors has more long-term debt [12]. There is a positive and significant relationship 
between debt and firm value in countries with double taxation system but not in countries 
with imputation system [13]. The difference in those relationships depends on corporate tax 
rate and personal tax rate which reduces the tax advantage coming from corporate 
borrowing [14]. On the contrary, leverage also can influence firm value negatively [15]. 
The company which wants to increase firm value should only take leverage up to the 
optimum point because after that point, leverage will bring more cost than benefit [16]. 
H1: Leverage mediates the influence of corporate governance towards firm value 
 
The relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy may differ 
depending upon the access of interest-bearing debt [17]. In South Africa, Kenya and Ghana, 
it was found that there was positive relationship between corporate governance and 
dividend payout as the other researches [18][19], while in Nigeria, corporate governance 
was linked negatively to dividend payout. Companies in Nigeria tended to reduce the cost 
of debt [17]. Regarding dividend policy and firm value, dividend per share and dividend 
yield are both factors in determining share prices [20]. Dividend per share has significant 
and positive relation with firm value while dividend yield has significant and negative 
relationship with firm value [20]. Dividends have positive information that earnings and 
other variable do not [15]. Investors in countries with poor investor protection will prefer 
dividends more because private benefits are more likely to happen [21]. Indonesia itself is 
considered as having poor legality, shareholder rights, and judicial efficiency compared 
with 13 other countries with emerging markets [7]. Conversely, it was found that dividend 
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yield influenced shares prices negatively but dividend payout sometimes gave positive 
influence [22]. Dividend policy may have clientele effect on investors [20]. 
H2: Devidend policy mediates the influence of corporate governance towards firm 
value 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework 
 
3. Research method 
The sample used in this study are companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
in the year of 2014, which are amounted to 181 companies. The data used is the secondary 
data which is financial data from financial statements of companies listed in IDX for the 
period which ended on December 31, 2014, dividends paid during 2014 and shares prices 
on April 30, 2015. The data was processed using the Partial Least Square (PLS) Warp. The 
following table elaborates indicators and operational definition of variables: 
 
Table 1 Operational Definition of Variables 
Variables Symbol Indicators Definition 
Corporate 
Governance 
(CG) 
BS Board size The number of members in board of commissioners 
AC Audit committee 
The number of members in audit committee of a 
company 
AQ Audit quality 
Whether a company using big four public 
company or not, measured by a scale of 1 for 
companies using big-four public accounting firm 
and 0 for companies using non-big-four public 
accounting firm 
Firm value (FV) 
Q Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity + debt)/Assets 
PBV Price to book value (Market value per share)/Book value per share 
Leverage (Lev) 
D/E Debt to equity ratio Total debt/Total equity 
D/A Debt to assets ratio Total debt/Total assets 
Dividend Policy 
(Div) 
DPR Dividend payout ratio Dividend per share/ Earnings per share 
DY Dividend yield Dividend per share/ Price per share 
Corporate 
Governance 
Leverage 
Dividend 
Policy 
Firm Value 
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4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Direct influences 
Table 2 Direct Influences 
Direct Relationship Β-value P-value Conclusion 
CG → Lev 0.26 < 0.01 Accepted 
CG → Div 0.28 < 0.01 Accepted 
CG → FV 0.18 < 0.01 Accepted 
Lev→ FV -0.17 < 0.01 Accepted 
Div → FV 0.21 < 0.01 Accepted 
 
Corporate governance is found to have positive and significant impact on leverage. 
Corporate governance can increase the creditors’ trust so that the credit access will be 
higher, the level of leverage increases and cost of debt decreases [11]. This can happen 
because higher level of CG make a company able to have more long-term financing [12]. 
By reducing agency problems, corporate governance, then, will increase the trust of 
creditors about the optimal condition of the company which lead to increase in leverage. 
Corporate governance positively and significantly correlate to dividend policy. By 
improving corporate governance, a firm can increase the minorities’ right which led to 
increase in dividend policy. The empirical finding shows that corporate governance 
influences dividend policy positively. Corporate governance can protect minorities’ right in 
dividend policy [18]. Thus, higher level of corporate governance means higher dividend 
policy.  
Corporate governance also has positive impact on firm value. Companies in countries 
with weak legal protection system, including Indonesia, can increase their credibility by 
improving their Corporate governance because it signals about investor protection and 
asymmetric information reduction [3][6]. Corporate governance can solve agency 
problems. Having more transparent information and good relationship can assure the 
investors about the credibility of a firm. 
This study showed that leverage affects firm value negatively, and supported study the 
previous study by [15] [16]. Leverage can increase firm value until certain point [16]. After 
it is reached, the increase of leverage will influence negatively towards firm value. The 
increase experienced by firm value until the maximum point is caused by the existence of 
leverage which brings more tax benefit than cost of debt. When the cost of debt is higher 
than the benefit, firm value will decline because the investors feel that the investment is too 
risky. Thus, firm value will increase until certain point then there is a decline. 
In the agency theory, it is explained that the interest of shareholders is to gain more 
return while the interest of management is to retain or have private benefit. By sharing part 
of profits as dividends, investors can consider that the firm has minorities’ right which lead 
to increase in firm value. This research also found that dividend policy positively influence 
firm value. Investors in countries with poor investor protection (such as Indonesia) will 
prefer dividends more because private benefits are more likely to happen [21]. 
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4.2 The mediating effects of leverage on corporate governance-firm value 
relationship 
Figure 2 showed the empirical result of the direct effect of corporate governance on firm 
value. It showed that p-value <.01with the beta value of 0.18. 
 
Figure 2. Direct Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Value 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Mediating Effect of Leverage on Corporate Governance-Firm Value 
Relationship 
 
Figure 3 showed that the direct effect was still significant (p-value <.01), but the beta 
value increased from 0.18 to 0.20. This was not a sign for the existence of mediating effect. 
Therefore the hypothesis 1 stating that leverage mediates the influence of corporate 
governance towards firm value cannot be accepted. Ensuring that management takes the 
best action to create long-term and sustainable value is a main topic in agency theory. By 
having corporate governance, a firm can signal to investors about its credibility. Besides, 
corporate governance also can increase the transparency of a firm. Transparency can reduce 
the asymmetric information between management and investors. Corporate governance has 
already influenced firm value, whether the companies have high or lower leverage. 
Corporate governance can signal to investors about investors’ protection and reduction of 
asymmetric information through fulfilling their transparency obligations [3] [6]. Corporate 
governance influences leverage positively [11] [12]. By implementing and improving 
corporate governance, a company can increase the confidence of creditors, hence increasing 
the leverage level too. Higher leverage means higher risk, and at the same time can 
potentially lower firm value. Decreasing firm value is caused by uneasy investors of higher 
risk. Even though debt brings tax benefit; it also brings higher risks for investors, such as 
bankruptcy costs [15]. 
 
4.3 The mediating effects of devidend policy on corporate governance-firm 
value relationship 
Figure 4 showed that the direct effect was still significant (p-value is more than 1%, but still 
less than 5 %), and the beta value decreased from 0.18 to 0.14. This was a sign for the 
existence of partial mediation effect. Therefore the hypothesis 2 stating that dividend policy 
mediates the influence of corporate governance towards firm value can be accepted. 
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Figure 4. The Mediating Effect of Devidend Policy on Corporate Governance-Firm Value 
Relationship 
 
In countries with weak legal protection system, corporate governance could enhance 
credible investor protection signal and reduce asymmetric information [5] [16]. Corporate 
governance could increase the right of minorities to obtain their dividend which meant 
higher corporate governance showed higher dividend policy [19].  The investors will feel 
safer about their dividend rights of minorities if companies have corporate governance. The 
trust of investors, then eventually will increase firm value.  
 
5. Conclusion and suggestions 
The focus of this study is to examine the mediating effects of leverage and dividend policy 
on corporate governance-firm value relationship in the Indonesian stock Exchange (IDX). 
Empirical findings showed the following results. Firstly, leverage did not mediate the 
influence of corporate governance towards firm value. Secondly, dividend policy mediated 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. Further research should 
expand into industrial sectors and/or using a longer period and using different indicator for 
each variable. For the practitioners, it is better to improve corporate governance, keep the 
leverage low and watching the effects of dividend policy towards firm value.  
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